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Introduction
The vices and virtues of international investment agreements have been intensively debated during recent years. Much of this critique concerns substantive undertakings in investment agreements, such as the commonly included obligations to provide "fair and equitable treatment", and to compensate in case of direct and indirect expropriation. Severe critique has also been directed against the dispute settlement mechanisms in the agreements, such as the possibility for investors to request arbitration outside host countries' legal systems, arbitrators' alleged partiality, the lack of appeal possibilities, the lack of transparency of the arbitration proceedings and outcomes, and the incoherence of the case law. 1 A particularly contentious feature of virtually all of these agreements is that they do not only allow contracting states to litigate-State-State Dispute Settlement (SSDS)-they also allow private investors to request arbitration, that is, they allow for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). 2;3 The possibility for private parties to litigate against foreign states is a rarity in International Law, since international agreements normally reserve the right to legally challenge the ful…llment of the obligations under the agreements to the contracting states. The ISDS mechanisms have been criticized on various grounds. Of most immediate relevance from an economic point of view is the claim that they cause excessive litigation relative to some (normally unspeci…ed) benchmark. 4;5 Several high-pro…le disputes under investment agreements have fuelled the notion that ISDS causes undesirable litigations. Many of these disputes have concerned the energy sector. A wellknown case in the threat by TransCanada Corporation to litigate against the US under NAFTA regarding the Obama administration's decision to disallow the construction of the Keystone XL pipe line. The company was in the process of requesting USD 15 billion in damages when the decision by the Obama administration was overturned by the current administration. It seems unlikely that the Canadian government would have been willing to pursue the case had there only been SSDS in NAFTA.
The by far most prominent agreement with regard to investment litigation in general, and the energy sector in particular, is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), an investment-cum-trade agreement 1 See e.g. Howse (2017) and Stiglitz (2008) for comprehensive overviews and discussions of the critique against investment agreements.
2 See Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) for an introduction to International Investment Law, and Bernasconi-Osterwalder (2014) for a discussion of legal aspects of SSDS.
3 Two remarks on terminology: First, for practical reasons we will use the term "litigation" to denote what more correctly should be denoted "request arbitration" (since litigation is normally used in the context of civil lawsuits). Second, the term "ISDS" is often used synonymously with "investment agreements", but we here use it in its literal sense, as referring to a particular type of dispute settlement. 4 See e.g. Gertz (2017) , Johnson et al. (2015) , Menon (2018) , Roberts (2014) , Salacuse (2007) , and Trevino (2013) for recent discussions of SSDS, and other non-ISDS mechanisms. 5 Other observers who are highly critical of certain basic features of IIAs, do not percieve that the legal standing of private investors is problematic. For instance, Howse (2017) , and over two hundred academics addressing President Trump concerning the NAFTA renegotiations, argued that the problem is not the legal standing of private investors, but rather that the agreement allows investors to by-pass the domestic legal system; the latter letter is available at https://www.citizen.org/system/…les/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf. 1 covering the energy sector. The ECT has approximately 50 members, including all 27 EU countries (Italy recently withdrew), and a number of former socialist countries in Asia. Of the approximately 860 known investment disputes, 119 have taken place under the ECT. A number of high-pro…le ECT disputes seem to illustrate the importance of the ISDS mechanism. For instance, there have been more than 40 litigations against Spain regarding the removal of support to renewable energy.
Only a few cases have yet been decided, but Spain has already been requested to pay over EUR 200 million in compensation. Italy and the Czech Republic have also been the targets for such litigations, albeit with fewer cases than Spain. Most of the litigants in these cases are European …rms. It is hard to believe that European governments would have pursued these litigations on behalf of their investors, had the ECT only allowed for SSDS.
Another suggestive example is the litigation by the energy company Vattenfall AB against Germany regarding the decision in the wake of the Fukushima accident to speed up the phaseout of nuclear energy. Vattenfall AB is a private limited liability company, but it is fully owned by the Swedish state. The litigation has been ongoing with Social Democrats and the Green Party in a coalition government, parties have made repeated commitments in the past to phase out nuclear power in Sweden. As members of the government, these parties are now e¤ectively litigating by proxy against Germany regarding the costs of its phasing out of nuclear power. It seems inconceivable that this government would have litigated directly against Germany if the ECT only allowed for SSDS. 6 There have also been contentious disputes outside the energy sector that seem to illustrate the role of ISDS. A well-known example is the litigation by Phillip Morris against Australia regarding its tobacco plain packaging legislation, which Phillip Morris largely lost. It seems unlikely that the Obama Administration would have been willing to pursue the case on behalf of the tobacco company.
The mounting skepticism toward ISDS is also re ‡ected in the fact that several countries have moved toward some form SSDS. For instance, the investment chapter of the US-Australia trade agreement of 2005, which includes investment protection, only allows for SSDS, and this only after investors have exhausted the possibilities to use local legal systems. South Africa is moving in the same direction. 7 Brazil never had ISDS agreements, and its new model investment treaty is based on SSDS. 8 In side letters to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Paci…c Partnership, New Zealand has excluded ISDS with Australia and Peru, and reduced the scope for ISDS with three 6 Adding to the political complexity of the case, Sweden compensated the German energy …rm E.On when Sweden in 1997 closed its Barsebäck nuclear reactor.
7 Th requirement that investors must …rst take their cases to host country courts, can serve as a …lter that protects both home and host country governments, since investors might be deterred from bringing disputes if these domestic legal processes are slow, unless having strong cases.
8 Another reason for the increasing focus on SSDS is that preferential trade agreements today routinely include investment undertakings. There is a tension in these agreements in that most other chapters allow solely for SSDS. One can perhaps also see the changes that the EU is undertaking with regard to the investment undertaking in their ageements, whereby the adjudication mechanism is taking a form that is similar to the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO, as a step toward a convergence of ISDS and SSDS. other partner countries. A further, and very recent example, is the recently concluded renegotiation of NAFTA. In a public testimony, the US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer stated:
Why should a foreign national be able to come in and not have the rights of Americans in the American court system but have more rights than Americans have in the American court system? It strikes me as something that at least we ought to be skeptical of and analyze. So a US person goes into a court system, goes through the system and they're stuck with what they get. A foreign national can do that and then at the end of the day say "I want three guys in London to say we're going to overrule the entire US system." 9
The revised version of the NAFTA has drastically reduced the scope for ISDS. Canada has completely withdrawn from ISDS, and the possibility to use ISDS in investment disputes between Mexico and the US has been substantially reduced.
The purpose of this paper is to throw some light on the di¤erence between ISDS and SSDS.
To the best of our knowledge, there exist no economic analysis of the di¤erence between ISDS and SSDS. This largely re ‡ects a more general lack of literature on investment agreements, and in particular on dispute settlement in IIAs. The main exception to this dearth of literature is the seminal analysis by Aisbett et al (2010) (see below) . There is a recent small theory literature, but although it often purports to address "ISDS", it does not highlight di¤erences between ISDS and SSDS as modes of dispute settlement, but invvestment agreements more generally. 10 The paper more speci…cally examines the common claim in the policy debate that host countries would bene…t from switching from ISDS to SSDS. The analysis captures the standard argument in the legal literature concerning the motive for ISDS, which holds that litigation by states tends to create political/diplomatic "enforcement costs" that do not arise when litigation is made by private parties on purely commercial grounds. On this vciew, the purpose of ISDS is hence to depoliticize investment disputes. 11
The model to be employed, which is laid out in Section 3, builds on the analysis by Horn and Tangerås (2017, "H-T") of the regulatory (or indirect) expropriation rules in investment agreements; H-T in turn borrows important features from Aisbett et al (2010) . 12 Absent an agreement, the interaction takes place in three stages. In a representative industry, a …rm …rst makes an irreversible investment. An exogenous regulatory shock that determines the welfare impact of the investment for host country welfare is then realized. Finally, having observed the shock, the host country either allows production or it regulates, in the latter case e¤ectively shutting down production.
Two fundamental distortions interact to form the outcome. First, the host country interest in attracting foreign investments stems from the positive externalities they cause. But depending on the realization of the regulatory shock, investments may occasionally turn out also to have undesirable e¤ects. When …rms invest, they disregard these consequences for the host country.
Second, when the host country decides on whether to regulate, it does not factor the e¤ect of regulation for investors into its decision. There is thus a tendency toward overregulation. These distortions can interact in rather complex fashion, simple as they are when considered separately.
But they can create a form of hold-up problem where there is too little investment, and too much regulation, from a joint welfare point of view. The role of the investment agreement is to partially or fully remedy these distortions.
An investment agreement is introduced in Section 4. The agreement is formed at the outset of the interaction, and it speci…es when regulation is compensable, and by how much. The agreement requires the host country to fully compensate investors for foregone operating pro…ts if regulation occurs when the regulatory shock is less severe than a speci…ed level, here denoted the level of investment protection. But the agreement allows the host country to regulate without compensation for regulatory shocks that are more severe than this level. The level of investment protection is determined during the negotiation over an agreement. The novelty in this paper relative to H-T is that the agreement also speci…es whether investors or the source country government has legal standing to litigate against the source country.
Section 5 characterizes the outcome with an investment agreement. The agreement will induce the host country to abstain from regulating for a range of shocks. But the host country might regulate despite having to pay compensation for a range of more severe shocks. In such instances litigation is required to enact the compensation payments. To capture the above-mentioned standard rationale for ISDS, it is assumed that litigation under SSDS exposes the source country government to political costs that are not borne by private investors when litigating. A shift from ISDS to SSDS will thus introduce a form of enforcement costs. The direct implication of these political litigation costs is that the source country government tends to litigate less frequently than private investors all else equal, along the lines suggested in the policy debate. The question is then: is the host country better of with SSDS thn with ISDS?
The paper identi…es two mechanisms through which host countries might bene…t from switching from ISDS to SSDS. One possibility is that the tendency toward less litigation that comes with SSDS allows the host country to escape its protection commitments in certain industries. To capture this source of gain, which seems to be in line with what critics of ISDS have in mind, Section 6 assumes that the level of investment protection is exogenously determined, and una¤ected by a shift from ISDS to SSDS. Such a shift will then have no e¤ect for the host country in industries where the political litigation costs are small enough not to deter the source country from litigating in case of compensable regulation. But when the litigation costs exceed this level, the direct e¤ect of shifting from ISDS to SSDS will indeed be bene…cial for the host country, since only a subset of all cases where the source country government could successfully litigate will then actually be brought to litigation. This reduces the frequency of instances where the host country has compensate investors.
Additionally, in situations where the source country abstains from litigating due to the litigation costs, the host country can regulate without cost whenever this is unilaterally optimal. Hence, SSDS allows more frequent uncompensated regulation, and it yields less frequent compensation payments, for given investments. It might thus appear as if SSDS is bene…cial to the host country.
This argument fails to take into account however, that the shift to SSDS will tend to reduce …rms'incentives to invest, and that this in turn will a¤ect the incentives to regulate. The net e¤ect of the shift to SSDS on host country welfare is therefore ambiguous. At the same time, the shift unambiguously reduces the welfare of the source country government, since it will be exposed to enforcement costs that its investors do not have to carry with ISDS, or alternatively have to at least partly give up on enforcing compensation for its investors.
The second mechanism through which a shift to SSDS might bene…t the host country, is by a¤ ecting the negotiations between the parties over the substantive provisions in the agreement, here represented by the level of investment protection. For reasons to be explained in Section 7, the negotiations are likely to yield a too high level of protection from the host country's perspective with ISDS. Hence, if a shift to SSDS reduces the level of protection somewhat, it will tend to bene…t the host country. This will come about though more frequent regulation, a reduced range of regulatory shocks for which there is litigation, and a reduced magnitude of compensation payments-changes that could all be seen as re ‡ecting increased host country policy space.
Again there are counter-arguments to the claim that a shift to SSDS is bene…cial for the host country. First, it is unclear whether the shift to SSDS will reduce or increase the level of investment protection-this will depend on the exact circumstances at hand, including the magnitude of the political litigation costs. Second, and more profoundly, if the host country is able to control the choice of dispute settlement system, it would be better o¤ to use its bargaining power to negotiate less demanding substantive undertakings in the agreement, while maintaining ISDS. Put di¤erently, the problem with the investment agreement from a host country perspective is not the ISDS mechanism as such, but the substantive undertakings that are enforced using this mechanism.
The Energy Charter Treaty
Before turning to the formal analysis, we …rst very brie ‡y describe the ECT, in light of its importance for investment disputes. The negotiations over the ECT were initiated shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Signed in 1994, the agreement entered into force in 1998. The general purpose of the ECT is to promote long-term cooperation in the energy …eld. An important political driving force behind the creation of the ECT was the desire to help former socialist countries to transition toward becoming market economies, and members of the GATT/WTO. There were also EU interests in getting access to cheap, geographically close, sources of energy supply.
The ECT is an unusual agreement in several respects: It is one of very few investment agreements that covers a single industrial sector; it was one of the …rst agreements to include both trade and investment undertakings in the same agreement; and it is the only multilateral investment agreement There is also a further important restriction to the scope of the exceptions clause in Art. 24 in that it does not apply to the expropriation rules. Hence, the carve-outs for regulatory policies seem quite restricted.
As most investment agreements, the ECT contains rules concerning compulsory dispute settlement. It allows for ISDS regarding investment promotion and investment protection undertakings.
Investors can bring disputes to either host country courts, to international arbitration, or to ". . . any 6 applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure". There are certain exceptions to this rule, however. For instance, some countries have reserved the right to refuse to have their disputes resubmitted to international arbitration after adjudication in a local court. As all investment agreements, the ECT also provides for SSDS.
The ECT is by far the investment agreement with the largest number of litigations. All 119 disputes that have been brought under the ECT involve ISDS. 13 More than half of these disputes concern renewable energy measures in Spain (42), Italy (11), and the Czech Republic (6), respectively. Italy withdrew from the ECT in 2016, but investment in place at the time of withdrawal will be protected for a further 20 years. Of the 45 cases that have so far been concluded, 18 cases where decided in favor of the responding state, 14 in favor of the investor, and the remaining 13 cases where discontinued, settled, or decided in favor of neither party.
The setting absent an investment agreement
The setting absent an investment agreement is a special case of the framework used in H-T. Consider a country that is potential host to foreign direct investment from a source country in a number of industries. The industries might di¤er with regard to technology, demand, etc. To remove interactions that do not seem to be of …rst-hand importance to the issues at stake here, the industries are economically unrelated. In each industry there is a single, foreign, …rm. We could alternatively have assumed that there is a large number of symmetric perfectly competitive investors, without qualitatively a¤ecting the analysis below, as long as they would have to be treated identically by the host and the source country. The lack of domestic …rms in these industries is potentially less innocuous, since there could be a role for a National Treatment if there are domestic …rms. It seems reasonable to disregard such complications for a …rst analys of the di¤erence between the two types of dispute settlement systems, however. These assumptions also imply that we can omit industry and …rm indices.
At the outset, the investor in the representative industry makes an irreversible investment k 0 in the host country. The …rm's investment cost R(k) 0 is a strictly increasing, weakly convex function of the investment k. The investor receives the operating pro…t (k) 0 if production is allowed; (k) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in k, and (0) = 0: For the host country, an investment creates bene…ts in terms of consumer surplus, employment, technological spill-overs, learning-by-doing in the work-force, and so forth-the exact nature of these bene…ts is immaterial for our purposes. After the investments have been committed, an industry-speci…c shock is realized that a¤ects the net bene…t to the host country of allowing production. High realizations of could represent the arrival of severely adverse information regarding environmental or health consequences of the production process or the goods produced, or other factors a¤ecting the desirability of the investment. The shock is continuously distributed on [ ; ] with cumulative distribution function F ( ) and density f ( ).
Having observed this common-knowledge shock, the host country decides whether to permit production or to regulate the production facility. Regulation implies that production is e¤ectively shut down, and thus deprives the …rm of its operating pro…ts: (k) = 0. This is the sole consequence of regulation for the source country. The host country welfare is V (k; ) in case production allowed.
V (k; ) captures the net of the positive and negative e¤ects of the investment. The higher the realization of ; the smaller is the net e¤ect of the investment: V (k; ) < 0 (subscripts on functional operators denote partial derivatives throughout). V (k; ) can be either positive or negative in case of production, and it is zero if there is no production. The marginal net bene…t of investment can also be positive or negative, V k (k; ) ? 0 , but V is strictly concave in k. 14 To ensure that there is a role to play for investment and regulation, we assume that there is a range of k for which the host country prefers production if the shock is su¢ ciently mild, V (k; ) > 0, and prefers regulating if it is su¢ ciently severe, V (k; ) < 0.
The interaction is solved for backwards in standard fashion. Absent an investment agreement, the last stage of the interaction is the decision by the host country of whether to regulate, given the investments and the realized regulatory shock : The host country is more prone to regulate, the higher is ; since V < 0: Since regulation yields zero welfare level for the host country, the host country will allow production for a given k whenever V (k; ) 0; and it will regulate if V (k; ) < 0:
That is, it will regulate if and only if > (k); where (k) is de…ned by
In each industry, the investment is made prior to the realization of the regulatory shock ; and prior to the regulatory decision. To capture the notion that investors are small relative to their respective markets, we assume that representative investor does not take into consideration how its investment a¤ects the probability of regulation. 15 If the investor expects regulation for > 0 ; its expected pro…t is
and the optimal investment is
1 4 Functions (k); R(k); and V (k; ) are assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable. 1 5 We could e.g. have assumed that the industry is perfectly competitive, in which case it would have been natural to assume that each investor disregardsw the impact on the probability of regulation. H-T show the …rst-best outcome might actually be easier to implement through an investment agreement if …rms invest strategically with regard to the host country regulation. But this requires agreements that are contractually more sophisiticated than the type of agreement considered here.
with associated …rst-order condition (FOC)
It follows from F ( 0 ) > 0; and R k > 0; that k (K( 0 )) > 0 in the relevant region, and from the second-order condition that K > 0: The expected pro…t is
which must be non-negative in order for the …rm to invest.
The equilibrium absent an investment agreement (k N ; N ) will then be given by
N is thus the cut-o¤ value for regulation when investment is k N ; and the investment will be k N when the investor foresees the cut-o¤ level for regulation to be N :
The equilibrium expected pro…t is
and the equilibrium expected host country welfare is
Note that there are two basic distortions at work. First, the investor disregards both the positive and the negative externalities from the investment for the host country. Second, when the host country makes it regulatory decision, it disregards the source country welfare that is generated through production, and that takes the form of operating pro…ts. Each of these distortions is simple, but their interaction turns out to be less trivial. The outcome will typically entail distortions of both investment and regulation, however.
An investment agreement
To remedy the distortions to investment and regulatory decisions, the home and the host countries can enter into an investment agreement at the outset of the interaction, before investments are made.
9
The terms of an agreement
One should expect that the parties could achieve a …rst-best outcome if given su¢ cient freedom to design an investment agreement. A critical issue is therefore the constraints that we impose on the contracting. Actual investment agreements share a number of features that are central from a contractual point of view:
1. Agreements stipulate transfer payments to be made in certain situations in case host countries regulate;
2. There are no payments to or from outside parties;
3. There are occasionally carve-outs from compensation requirements for certain types of regulatory measures;
4. Any compensation equals foregone operating pro…ts; and 5. The agreement speci…es whether ISDS and/or SSDS is allowed.
Investment agreement are hence highly incomplete in several regards. For instance, there is no direct contracting on investment levels or on regulation, investors and the host country instead retain unilateral discretion over these decisions. Also, there cannot be any direct subsidies, taxes on investors, or punitive damages.
To formally capture the above salient features, an investment agreement is assumed to consist of two components. The …rst is a compensation function T that stipulates when regulation is compensable, and the amount to be paid. To represent the features listed above, for each industry the requested compensation is
That is, compensation is required if the regulatory shock is weaker than a threshold value 0 , but not for shocks that are more severe than 0 : Furthermore, whenever regulation is compensable, the compensation should equal the foregone operating pro…ts. 16 Second, as discussed above, investment agreements normally allow both investors and states to litigate. But states hardly ever use this option in practice. To avoid introducing strategic interactions between the source country government and its investors regarding who should litigate, it is assumed that the agreement allow for either investor-state or state-state dispute settlement, that is, either ISDS or SSDS.
The speci…cation of the dispute settlement system applies to all industries in both countries, as is almost invariably the case in IIAs. But the substantive undertakings-the level of protection 1 6 H-T show that the compensation scheme (2) has several desirable e¢ ciency properties, simple as it is.
10 0 that the agreement specify-is industry-speci…c. This is not a self-evident assumption. IIAs have few if any explicit industry speci…c obligations (the Energy Charter Treaty being a prominent exception). But as argued by H-T, it is conceptually hard to compare regulatory treatment across industries: what would it mean to say that an agreement gives the same degree of protection to investment in nuclear power, as to investment in the auto industry? The level of protection that an agreement imposes will thus in practice have to be determined for each industry separately. This is also re ‡ected in treaty texts when stating that their substantive obligations should be interpreted in light of the speci…c circumstances at hand.
The sequence of events with an investment agreement
When the host and the source country have entered into an agreement specifying a level of investment protection 0 ; and a dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS or SSDS), the sequence of events is as follows in each industry:
1. The …rm invests;
2. An industry-speci…c shock is realized;
3. The host country decides whether:
-to allow production;
-to regulate with compensation; or -to regulate without compensation; and 4. The investor or the source country decide whether to litigate.
To capture the central notion that governments face political and/or diplomatic costs when initiating a litigation against foreign states that are not felt by private investors, we assume that SSDS gives rise to a political/diplomatic cost L for the source country government that private investors are not exposed to. 17 This formalization of the di¤erence between ISDS and SSDS is analytically very simple, but it does seem to capture the core aspect of the common perception of the di¤erence between these dispute settlement systems. We will discuss alternative formulations in Section 9. 18 In stage 3, the host country can choose to regulate, and then either pay, or not pay, compensation.
There is no direct bene…t in the model for the host country to defer paying compensation, face litigation and then be made to pay the compensation with certainty. But for political litigation costs to matter, there must at least potentially be litigation, and this requires in turn that the host country regulates without spontaneously paying compensation for compensable regulation in certain instances. It is not straightforward to explain why rational parties would end up in a symmetric information-setting as ours (in particular not if disputes are costly). 19 At the same time we observe a large number of investment disputes in practice, despite the litigation costs that are involved. To avoid having to introduce elaborate asymmetric information reasons for the disputes, we assume that in the choice between regulating and paying compensation spontaneously, and regulating without compensation, the host country chooses the latter. 20 Intuitively, this could be explained by political gains for the host country government from being seen to resist challenges by foreign investors, or from discounting. 21;22 5 The equilibrium outcome with an investment agreement
The only di¤erence between the setting with ISDS and with SSDS is the magnitude of the political litigation costs; L = 0 with ISDS and L > 0 with SSDS. We can therefore derive the outcome with both settings at the same time by solving for the equilibrium recursively with L 0.
Litigation incentives
Consider a situation where the representative …rm has invested k; and where an investment agreement requests compensation for regulation in case > 0 where 0 > N ; the latter restriction ensures that the agreement o¤ers protection for a range of situations where the host country would regulate absent an agreement (which is required for the agreement to be meaningful). If > 0 , there will clearly be no litigation, since regulation is not compensable. But regulation is compensable if 0 . With ISDS, the investor always litigates when compensable regulation has occurred, since it yields compensation (k), but does not give rise to any costs. 23 With SSDS, the source country government face political/diplomatic litigation costs. For there to be litigation, enough compensation must be at stake relative to the litigation costs, that is, it is required that (k) L: There is thus a minimal investment level K(L) 1 (L)) that is just enough to trigger litigation, with
Hence, the higher is L; the 1 9 Most formal explanations of disputes assume asymmetrically informed parties, partly stochastic determinations, etc. Aisbett et al (2010) provide an interesting analysis of an investment agreement with less than perfectly informed arbitrators.
2 0 For instance, we could instead assume that the host country randomizes between regulating with and without spontaneously paying compensation when it knows that it will ultimately have to pay compensation. As long as there is some strictly positive probability for regulation to occur without compensation, the litigation costs would enter the picture in the same way as in what follows.
2 1 See e.g. Salacuse (2007, pp.149 ) for a discussion of the political factors that might motivate governments to take disputes to formal arbitration.
2 2 A legal process might be necessary to verify both liability and the magnitude of compensation when the facts of the case (and perhaps also the law) are unclear.
2 3 Section 9 discusses the impact of private litigation costs.
12 larger the investment have to be to induce the source country government to litigate. We will refer to the constraint k K(L) as the enforcement constraint for the industry.
Lemma 1 With SSDS, there will be litigation if and only if k K(L); < 0 ; and uncompensated regulation has occurred:
Regulation incentives
Consider next the host country's decision problem, when an agreement stipulates a level of investment protection 0 ; and the investment level is k K(L): The host country never regulates when (k); since it then prefers production to regulation regardless of whether there is an agreement, and it will always regulate for (k) 0 < ; since this requires no compensation according to the agreement, and it is desirable from a unilateral perspective. But for in the intermediate range ( (k); 0 ); regulation requires compensation, and the host country decision is less clear. Let C (k) be the level of the regulatory shock for which the host country is indi¤erent between allowing production, and regulating with a compensation payment,
where the left-hand side is the welfare when allowing production, and the right-hand side is the welfare level when paying compensation. For a given level of investment, there will be less regulation under the agreement compared to the situation absent an agreement:
The host country will hence regulate if > max[ (k); 0 ] since it then unilaterally prefers regulation and there is no compensation requirement, or if > C (k) so that the host country prefers regulation regardless of whether this requires compensation payments.
Taking into account the subsequent enforcement incentives of the source country or its investors, the host country's incentives with regard to regulation are thus as follows:
Lemma 2 If the investment agreement stipulates the investment protection level 0 ; and investment is k; the host country regulates in either of the following situations:
In all four cases the regulatory shock is su¢ ciently severe that the host country would prefer to regulate as long as it does not have to pay compensation. In case (i), with k < K(L); there is no enforcement, so the host country regulates whenever this is unilaterally optimal, which is for
In case (ii), with k K(L); there is enforcement for 0 ; but this is immaterial since the degree of protection with the agreement is so low that it will never constrain the host country.
There will thus not be any violation of the agreement for < (k). There will be regulation for (k); but the agreement does not request any compensation in this case.
In case (iii) the host country will not regulate for (k) < 0 since it will then be forced to pay compensation, and this is makes it too costly to regulate. But it will regulate without compensation for > 0 : This case is illustrated in Figure 1a , where the horizontal axis measures the regulatory shock . The two lines at the bottom show the host country incentives to regulate depending on whether compensation is required or not. The next line depicts an agreement with a level of investment protection 0 < C (k): The uppermost line shows the resulting optimal behavior.
There will hence be regulation if and only if > 0 in this case.
Case (iv) is where the host will regulate for > C (k); even if this requires compensation payments for C (k) < < 0 : As discussed in H-T, this implies that the simple compensation scheme in (2) induces the host country to fully internalize the externalities of its regulatory decision, absent litigation costs. It also means that there will be litigation in order to extract compensation.
This scenario is illustrated in Figure 1b , which is constructed as Figure 1a , but for the case where
In what follows we concentrate on this case, since this is where compensable regulation occurs in equilibrium.
( Figure 1a and b about here)
Investment incentives
As discussed above, if the investor expects "industry" investment to fall short of the critical level for enforcement K(L); the investor expects there to be regulation without compensation for > N : 24
The expected pro…t is then
and the optimal investment volume is k N = K( N ): Necessary for this to be an equilibrium is that
If the expectation is instead that industry investment will exceed the critical level for enforcement K(L), there are two possibilties the investor to consider. One arises if 0 C (k); in which case the investor expects that there will be regulation without compensation for > 0 ; and regulation with ultimate compensation for < 0 : The other case is where 0 > C (k), and where thus there will be regulation with compensation for C (k) < < 0 ; and regulation without compensation for > 0 : Hence, the cut-o¤ for e¤ected compensation will be 0 in both cases, leading to the expected pro…t
and the optimal investment level is K( 0 ): For this to be an equilibrium it is required that K( 0 )
K(L):
In what follows it will be more convenient to express the enforcement constraint as
where (L) is the level of investment protection that just su¢ ces to trigger litigation in case of compensable regulation,
rather than to use the equivalent expression
We can then express that equilibrium investment behavior as follows:
Lemma 3 If the investment agreement stipulates investment protection level 0 ; the investment will be:
The equilibrium
Having derived the incentives regarding investment, regulation and litigation, we can now characterize the equilibrium outcome for a given agreement. To this end, and for future use, let E be the level of investment protection for an agreement that it is just low enough that there will not be any compensation payments in equilibrium. It is given by 25
To ensure that the increase in investment that would follow from an increase in the level of investment protection, does not trigger an increase in the regulatory threshold C that is larger than the increase in the level of investment protection, we assume that
Condition (3) is hence similar to "stability" conditions used in e.g. oligopoly theory. 26 2 5 Alternatively, we could have de…ned E by
2 6 Su¢ cient conditions for (3) to hold is that
To see what this would entail, note that the de…nition of the function C implies that
The sign of C k is generelly speaking ambiguous, since V < 0 and k > 0:
Lemmas 1-3 then yield the following characterization of the outcome for any given level of investment protection 0 :
Proposition 1 Assume that there is an agreement with the investment protection level 0 > N .
(1) If 0 (L) the agreement yields:
(2) If 0 < (L) the agreement yields:
(ii) regulation i¤ > N ; and (iii) no litigation.
Proof: The Proposition follows immediately from the above: If 0 (L); the agreement will be enforced if compensable regulation occurs. The investment will hence be K(
There is then regulation i¤ 2 ( (K( 0 )); 0 ), and there is then no requirement to compensate, so there will not be any litigation. If
There is then regulation for 2 ( (K( 0 )); 0 ); and compensation is required for 2 ( C (K( 0 )); 0 ). It will be enforced through litigation since 0 (L). The second part of the Proposition follows from Lemma 3.
SSDS to escape protection commitments
Host countries often …nd that their investment agreements impose too far-reaching compensation requirements in certain sectors. Indeed, some countries have even terminated their agreements to escape the obligations they impose. But a less drastic alternative that has been suggested in the policy debate is to retain the agreements, but changing the dispute settlement system from ISDS to SSDS. This raises the question of whether host countries bene…t from shifting from ISDS to SSDS, and in particular whether this is due to increased host country "policy space"? As will be shown in this and the ensuing Section, our framework captures two separate mechanisms through which a shift from ISDS to SSDS might give rise to the suggested types of bene…ts for the host country.
In this Section we consider an agreement that for some reason is requests too much investment protection in certain sectors for the host country to bene…t from the agreement in these sectors.
Intuitively, there are many plausible reasons why a host country might …nd itself in this position in practice. For instance, the host country might disagre with how arbitration panels have come to interpret the agreement, the agreement turns out not to generate as much investment in ‡ow as the host countries expected, or the bene…ts from the in ‡ows are not as large as expected. Or external factors have changed. For instance, the host country might have developed, and therefore become more concerned with regulation than when entering into the investment agreement. All of these explanations seem plausible as descriptions of actuality. But they are hard to reconcile with a full-information, frictionless theory of bargaining. But for the purpose of this Section it is not essential to know the exact reason for why the agreement is too restrictive in certain sectors. We will therefore examine the implications of switching from ISDS to SSDS for given, arbitrary levels of investment protection across industries.
The following Proposition characterizes the e¤ects of shifting to SSDS for a given level of investment protection 0 .
Proposition 2 (1) Switching from ISDS to SSDS in an industry with 0 (L):
(ii) only has the e¤ ect of imposing expected enforcement costs on the source country if 0 > E .
(2) Switching from ISDS to SSDS in an industry with 0 < (L):
(iii) increases the frequency of regulation for
(iv) has ambiguous implications for the frequency of regulation for E < 0 ;
(v) wipes out litigation and compensation payments for E < 0 ; and
Proof: (i) Since there is no litigation in equilibrium, the outcome is identical with ISDS and SSDS.
(ii) In case there is litigation in equilibrium, the source country will carry litigation costs for 2 (iv) There is regulation for > C (K( 0 )) with ISDS. The frequency of regulation is thus 1
; it is still possible that C (K( 0 )) < N since we allow for C k < 0: (v) Follows directly from the fact that there is no enforcement.
there will be no enforcement in case of compensable regulation for k K( 0 ), and the host will consequently regulate for such k whenever > (k): Hence, investment will fall to K( N ) and there will be regulation for
The Proposition thus suggests that a switch to SSDS might indeed allow the host country more "policy space," as often suggested to be desirable. Such a switch can reduce litigation and compensation, and possibly also induce increased regulation. Hence, switching to SSDS might solve problems where agreements are su¢ ciently ill-designed for certain industries that it would be better with no agreement for these industries. A natural example of this scenario might be the tobacco industry: while investors have full incentives to litigate with ISDS, a source country government might be unwilling to litigate on behalf of the tobacco …rms due to the bad reputation that this will cause-that is, the political litigation costs are very high. Some recent agreements have also excluded tobacco from the protection.
There are thus bene…cial aspects for a host country of switching from ISDS to SSDS. But these bene…ts do not come for free: the expectation of increased regulation will reduce investment in industries where the enforcement constraint is expected to be violated with SSDS, and this tends to hurt the host country. There is no guarantee that the e¤ective unravelling of the agreement that is brought about through the switch to SSDS will occur only in industries where the host country would prefer no agreement. The switch to SSDS might also reduce investment in industries where the host country would be better o¤ with the existing agreement than in the no-agreement situation.
This will tend to be harm the host country from an ex ante point of view. That is, as long as the same dispute settlement system is to be used across all industries, the switch to SSDS must be desirable "on average", across industries, in order for it to bene…t the host country.
Observation 1 For given levels of investment protection across industries, a switch from ISDS to SSDS will be inconsequential for the host country in some industries, and cause e¤ ective unravelling of the agreement in other industries. For the switch to bene…t the host country, the net e¤ ect of the unravelling across a¤ ected industries must be positive.
It can also be noted that as long as a shift from ISDS to SSDS has any impact, the source country loses from being exposed to enforcement costs, and/or from being deprived of investment protection. 27
SSDS to reduce negotiated investment protection
The previous Section considered implications of shifting to SSDS for arbitrary and constant levels of investment protection. These assumptions served to create a situation where a host country …nds itself bound by an agreement that is harmful as it applies to certain industries, and where the shift to SSDS becomes a means of escaping the commitments in sectors where there will not be enforcement with SSDS.
We now turn to the second mechanism through which a switch from the choice of dispute settlement system might a¤ect the the host country: by a¤ecting the negotiated level of investment protection that the agreement provides. To address this question, we need to introduce a bargaining stage at the outset of the interaction. The negotiations determines both the level of protection and the type of dispute settlement system that should be used. But to evaluate the argument regarding the desirability of shifting from ISDS to SSDS for the host country, we here examine whether the host country would bene…t from such a shift through the impact on the negotiations over the level of investment protection. For simplicy, we now assume that the agreement covers a single industry, and since we have already highlighted the role of binding enforcement constraints, we focus on cases where it does not bind in the industry under consideration, su¢ cient for which is that (L) <^ :
Also, we assume that the negotiated level of protection with ISDS entails equilibrium litigation and compensation payments ( E <^ ); this being the most interesting case for our purposes.
To characterize the outcome of the negotiations we …rst derive welfare expressions for the parties to the negotiation.
Expected welfare
The expected welfare of the parties will depend on whether there are compensation payments in equilibrium, and whether the enforcement constraint binds. When the enforcement constraint is ful…lled ( 0 (L)); the host country expected welfare is
is the expected compensation payment. The source country expected welfare is for
is the expected enforcement costs. 28 If the enforcement constraint is violated, that is 0 < (L); the host country welfare isṽ N ; and the expected source country welfare isỹ N , as de…ned above.
Negotiations
We will not employ any speci…c bargaining process, but instead assume that the bargaining maximizes the function B(Ṽ ;Ỹ ) subject to certain constraints. B is assumed to be strictly increasing in both arguments, and strictly concave in 0 : This could be compatible with e.g. a Nash Bargaining problem, or maximization of joint welfare. If the negotiations were to give a level of investment protection for the agreement is not enforced ( 0 < (L)); the outcome would be the same as if there 2 8Ỹ ( 0 ; L) is continuous in 0 , but has a kink at E since with 0 > E the home faces expected enforcement costs.
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were no agreement. Hence, for an outcome 0 to be relevant, it is required that 0 (L): Nor will the parties negotiate an outcome 0 < N . The negotiated level 0 is also constrained by an upper bound max ; which is the highest level of protection that the host country is willing to accept; max is the higher of the two solutions toṼ
An interior solution (L) to this maximization problem is given by the …rst-order condition
It implies thatṼ (
Hence, with an interior solution, the host country will prefer less protection, and the source country more protection, than the negotiated outcome. 29 
The …rst term captures the bene…t to Home from investment protection for additional realizations of (albeit that the pro…ts come in the form of compensation payments for these states). The second term re ‡ects the fact that for some realizations of for which the source country already receives protection, it will now have to litigate (if C k < 0); or alternatively that there will be realization of for which it no longer has to litigate (if
Whether the second e¤ect dominates the …rst will partly depend on the magnitude of the enforcement costs.
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The impact of shifting from ISDS to SSDS
The negotiated outcome with ISDS will always result in too much investment protection from the point of view of the host country. Consequently, the host country would bene…t from a shift to SSDS if it reduces the level of protection to some N eg (L) for whichṼ ( N eg (L)) >Ṽ ( N eg (0) ). (ii) reduce the magnitude of each compensation payment; and (iii) bene…t the host country.
Proof:
Part (i) follows from the fact that there is litigation for 2 ( C (K( 0 ))); 0 ), and this range increases in 0 due to the stability condition (3). 30 . Part (ii) stems from the fact that each compensation payment is (K( 0 )); with k > 0 and K 0 > 0. Part (iii) follows from the fact thatṼ ( (0)) < 0:
The case for shifting from ISDS to SSDS would be stronger with this mechanism than with the mechanism highlighted in the previous Section, in the sense that this shift would be bene…cial in any industry where the enforcement constraint does not bind. But the mechanism hinges on a crucial assumption: that the shift to SSDS reduces the negotiated level of protection. Will this be the case? It is possible, but not necessary even in the context of this simple framework:
Proposition 4 The denominator is negative by the second-order condition, so the sign of L is that ofỸ L :
The indeterminacy of the sign of this term stems from the ambiguous e¤ect of the level of investment protection on the expected political litigation costs. As can be seen from (??), a higher level of investment protection will a¤ect both the upper and the lower bound of the range of for which there is litigation. It would increase the upper limit, which would tend to makeỸ L negative. But it would have unclear e¤ects for the lower bound C (K( 0 )); due to the ambiguous sign of C k : If C k < 0; the lower bound on the range would fall, andỸ L would be ambiguously negative, in which case the shift toward SSDS would reduce the negotiated level of protection. If C k > 0; the impact onM will depend on the marginal frequencies at both ends of the range. 31 It is conceivable thatM < 0 when the frequency of falls signi…cantly over the range ( C (K( )); 0 ); in which casẽ
It is hence indeterminate whether the negotiated level of protection falls with SSDS even with joint welfare maximization. 32;33 3 1 The stability condition (3) ensures that 0 grows faster than C (K( 0 )); as we increase 0 ; but we here also have to take account of the marginal frequencies.
3 2 It would also be ambiguous with a Nash Bargaining solution. For instance, let the maximand for a Nash Bargaining problem with reservation utilities normalized to zero be
with A < 0 by the SOC. The …rst term in the brackets is non-negative sinceṼ < 0 andỸL = M L 0. It is hence in this sense even more unlikely that a shift to SSDS will reduce the level of investment protection with Nash Bargaining.
3 3 To see the issues involved, note …rst that C (K( 0 )) < 0 , this being the condition for equilibrium compensable regulation. Second, it follows from (3) that the upper bound on the range of for which there are compensable regulation (and thus enforcement costs with SSDS)-that is ( C (K( )); 0 )-increases faster in 0 than the lower bound. But it is still possible thatM < 0 for certain 0 2 ( E ; ). The reason is that as 0 increases, the impact oñ M will also depend on the frequencies at both ends of the range. But since condition (3) implies that C k K < 1; it would su¢ ce that f ( ) is non-decreasing forỸ L < 0. Similarly, k < 0 would su¢ ce, but there does not seem to be any reason why this should hold. (6) with SSDS such that N eg (L) = (L): That is, the parties might then with SSDS choose a higher level of investment protection than (L); a level that just ensures that the agreement is enforced.
The switch to SSDS might still bene…t the host country provided that (L) < (0): But it does not seem to plausibly depict considerations that go into the formation of actual agreements, that the parties design the agreement such that it just induces enough investment for litigation to be worthwhile for the source country when taking into account litigation costs.
To conclude, despite our simple formalization of enforcement costs, the impact of shifting from ISDS to SSDS depends in a rather complex way on the pro…tability of the industry, and the magnitude of the political costs of enforcing the agreement in the industry, since these will determine whether the enforcement constraint binds. It will also depend on the nature of the bargaining process, which will determine how the negotiated level of investment protection responds to the enforcement costs imposed on the source country. A shift to SSDS can bene…t the host country by reducing the level of investment protection. This is more likely to occur if the political litigation costs are small. But there does not appear to be any presumption that the level of investment protection will fall as a result of shifting from ISDS to SSDS.
The ine¢ ciency of SSDS
As we have just seen, in industries where the enforcement contraint is ful…lled with both ISDS and SSDS, the only concern for the host country is that the level of investment protection is too high.
Therefore, if the host country can control the dispute settlement system, it can in some situations bene…t from choosing SSDS rather than ISDS since this gives a lower level of investment protection.
But the source country strictly prefers ISDS to SSDS for any level of protection that is agreed upon.
Therefore, if the host country can control the type of dispute settlement system, it would be better o¤ it could induce the source country to accept a somewhat lower level of protection than would be negotiated with SSDS, against getting ISDS. Put di¤erently, SSDS is Pareto ine¢ cient. The reasoning can be seen in Figure 3 , where it can be seen how ISDS and a level of protection somewhat below (L) would be preferred by both parties to SSDS and the level of protection (L):
Proposition 5 In industries where the enforcement contraint is ful…lled with SSDS, the only concern for the host country is the level of investment protection. Both parties would bene…t from the host country conditioning the choice of ISDS on a level of investment protection that is marginally lower than what would be negotiated with SSDS.
Another source of ine¢ ciency in the setting here is the lack of side payments. Consider therefore the case where the agreement maximizes the joint expected welfare of the parties; as noted above, this could also capture a setting with two symmetric countries that negotiate an investment agreement covering two-way investment. The joint expected surplus is
The negotiated outcome is then
The di¤erence in aggregate welfare with ISDS and SSDS is theñ
There are thus two reasons why a shift to SSDS would reduce joint welfare: …rst, to the extent that there is compensable regulation in equilibrium with SSDS, a shift to SSDS will cause a direct welfare loss from the litigation costs; M > 0 in the above expression. Second, a shift to SSDS might distort the negotiated level of investment protection. This is represented in the expression above by the last two terms on the right-hand side, the sum of which is negative since
Proposition 6 An agreement that maximizes joint welfare will feature ISDS, and the level of investment protection (0):
Alternative formulations of the ISDS/SSDS distinction
We have formalized the standard explanation for the di¤erence between SSDS and ISDS-political and/or diplomatic enforcement costs with SSDS-in an analytically very simple fashion. But simple as it is, it does appear to capture essential aspects of the issue. But there are of course alternative ways of modeling this di¤erence, and there are alternatives aspects of how the two dispute settlement systems di¤er.
First, a common claim in favor of ISDS is that it provides for speedier resolution of disputes, which saves costs for the investors. Another explanation for why SSDS di¤ers from ISDS could be that source country governments put less weight on the pro…ts of their investors, compared to the investors themselves. To illustrate, assume that both investors and the source country government face regular litigation costs C, such as legal fees. Assuming that no mistakes are made in arbitration, the investor will litigate in case of compensable regulation if (k) > C: 34 With SSDS, the source country government faces the same process costs, but also the political costs L. The source country government puts a smaller weight < 1 on the pro…ts of the investor relative to the administrative costs, than do investors. Hence, the government will litigate if (k) > C + L. 35 The parameter could alternatively capture the loss of pro…ts due to a slower litigation process with SSDS, re ‡ecting the discounting of future compensation payments. As can be seen, since C > (C + L)= ; these alternative explanations for the di¤erence between ISDS and SSDS share the basic feature with the framework employed in the analysis above, in that the there will be a range of disputes for which the source country will refrain from litigating, while private investors will litigate.
The approaches will also di¤er in certain respects, however. 36 The political enforcement costs L will only a¤ect the outcome in situations where there is litigation, and the same is true for the discounting of the pro…t. But if the source country government puts less weight on the pro…t of an investor when deciding whether to litigate on behalf of the investor, the government will presumably also put less weight on the investor's pro…t when negotiating the agreement. This implies for instance that industries that are of less value to the source country government will have lower negotiated investment protection.
Second, it has been assumed above that the political/diplomatic enforcement are unrelated to the regulatory problem facing the host country, that is, that L and are uncorrelated. This implies that the decision regarding whether to enforce the agreement is unrelated to the severity of regulatory problem. Consequently, SSDS might cause the agreement to unravel in industries where it is desirable with production for the host country (and thus from a "global" point of view). But it seems plausible that the political enforcement costs and the severity of the regulatory problem often are positively correlated: it should be particularly costly politically for source countries to pursue cases in instances where the host country regulations are addressing severe regulatory problem. For instance, it would likely cause a government a substantial loss of political goodwill if it were to litigate on behalf of a tobacco producer regarding non-discriminatory host country health measures against smoking.
Finally, it has been assumed that the source country carries enforcement costs only when litigating in order to obtain compensation. An alternative would be to assume that enforcement e¤orts are required more generally to induce the host country to abide by the agreement whenever it would unilaterally prefer to regulate, that is, for all > (k): The source country expected welfare would then beỸ
whenever the enforcement constraint is ful…lled. The qualitative properties of the model would be much the same as above.
Conclusions
There have been frequent calls in the policy debate for changes to the dispute settlement system in investment agreements. A common idea has been to restrict the possibilities for private investors to litigate against host countries. Some countries have also moved in this direction with regard to their agreements. This paper is to the best of our knowledge the …rst economic analysis of the usefulness for host countries to heed these calls.
The paper focuses on the standard explanation for why SSDS yields less litigation than ISDSthe political/diplomatic costs that source country governments face when enforcing agreements on behalf of their investors. We have identi…ed two separate reasons why a host country might bene…t from SSDS in this framework. The …rst is that a switch to SSDS essentially causes the agreement to unravel in certain industries, due to the source country government's unwillingness to enforce the agreement. This could be bene…cial if the terms of the agreement are so demanding for the host country, that no agreement is better than the agreement with ISDS, and provided that the unravelling to a su¢ cient degree occurs in the right industries from the host country perspective.
The second reason why a shift to SSDS might increase host country welfare is that it might cause a renegotiation of the investment protection to a somewhat lower level. This will trigger increased 26 regulation, reduced compensation payments, etc., along the lines proposed in the debate.
These mechanisms do not provide convincing support of the usefulness for host countries to try to change the dispute settlement systemts in their agreements from ISDS to SSDS, however. First, when a shift from ISDS to SSDS leads to the unraveling of the agreement for a particular sector, there is no guarantee that this will occur in industries for which no protection is better than an agreement with ISDS, in particular not when the level of protection with ISDS forms part of a voluntary agreement. For instance, the enforcement costs that the source country government faces need not correlate with the undesirability of the industries from a host country point of view.
Second, our framework o¤ers no compelling support for the notion that negotiations under SSDS are likely to yield lower levels of investment protection than with ISDS.
Third, the existence of the enforcement costs under SSDS is a source of ine¢ ciency, both since they tend to directly reduce the expected welfare of the source country, and indirectly by a¤ecting the negotiated level of protection away from the ISDS level. SSDS is therefore ine¢ cient, and host country could therefore bene…t from o¤ering the source country ISDS, against concession with regard to the negotiated level of protection.
We thus conclude that if an agreement with ISDS stipulates too much investment protection from the host country's perspective, and the host country is able to determine the type of dispute settlement system, it should primarily aim to change the substantive undertakings in the agreements, rather than introduce imperfections in the functioning of the dispute settlement system in order to deliberately hamper the e¢ cacy of the agreement. 
